These more recent networks have increasingly consisted of interacting strategic agents, rather than components that were centrally designed by a single entity, and so it became natural for economic and game-theoretic considerations to merge increasingly with the computational considerations. Economics also began to investigate graphs as the underlying models for some of its core questions; these include the interactions of participants in a market, and questions concerning the diffusion of information, innovations, and behavior in an underlying social network.

## Alex Slivkins

Both fields have considered how a network's topology can arise as the result of strategic interactions among the nodes; Shenker [47] asked how such considerations would affect the structure of the growing Internet topology, and work beginning with Jackson and Wolinsky [48] in economic theory and Fabrikant et al. In addition to the structure of the network itself, there has been significant interest in both computer science and economics on the processes that take place on the underlying network.

The routing of traffic on networks is one such process, which as noted earlier formed one of the core settings for analyzing the price of anarchy [36]. Other active lines of work include analyses of the diffusion of information, innovations, and behaviors on social networks Rogers [51], Blume [52], and Ellison [53] ; and the outcome of. The perspective of computer science is evident in recent approaches to both of these two latter issues.

In the diffusion of innovations, one is led to an interesting algorithmic variation on the underlying question by considering how to intervene in it — in particular, how a centralized agent could optimally "seed" an innovation through careful selection of the starting nodes. This was asked by Domingos and Richardson [57]; since the optimal choice of seeds is computationally difficult, and lacking in any apparent tractable structure, subsequent work identified rich structural properties of near-optimal solutions that can be found through greedy optimization, by establishing a submodular property of the process Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [58].

In the context of trading and bargaining on networks, where participants in the network may repeatedly update their offers to others, there are deep connections to distributed updating algorithms related to belief propagation; Bayati et al. There is something natural in the broadening interface between computer science and economics — each can be viewed as a field focused on the design and analysis of extremely complex synthetic systems that are governed by phenomena we only partially understand and only partially know how to control.

And each field increasingly needs knowledge that resides in the other, as computer scientists seek to design and understand systems containing ever-increasing numbers of strategic agents, and economists seek to model the complex networks of interactions that lie between small-group environments and population-scale economic activity. This introduction has been designed to serve as a roadmap to some of the central themes in the papers that follow. The questions that these papers address in turn point to important issues that will continue to shape the interface between computer science and economics: Establishing guarantees for economic processes under increasingly general assumptions; developing methods to evaluate the performance of algorithms and mechanisms even in cases when they may not be the optimal choice; delineating the ways in which computational efficiency serves both to make certain outcomes feasible and to provide evidence for the infeasibility of others; and identifying design.

Hurwicz, Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes, in: K.

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Arrow, S. Karlin, P. Suppes Eds. Hurwicz, On informationally decentralized systems, in: C. Maguire, R. Radner Eds. Hurwicz, On the dimensional requirements of informationally decentralized pareto-satisfactory processes, in: K. Arrow, L. Hurwicz Eds. Mount, S. Reiter, The informational size of message spaces, Journal of Economic Theory 8 Spear, Learning rational expectations under computability constraints, Econometrica Anderlini, H.

Sabourian, Cooperation and effective computability, Econometrica 63 Anderlini, Communication, computability, and common interest games, Games and Economic Behavior 27 Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic mechanism design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 - Kfir-Dahav, D. Monderer, M.

## Gautam Kamath

Tennenholtz, Mechanism design for resource bounded agents, in: MultiAgent Systems, Papadimitriou, M. Schapira, Y. Nisan, I. Segal, The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices, Journal of Economic Theory Dasgupta, P. Hammond, E. Maskin, The implementation of social choice rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility, The Review of Economic Studies Harris, R.

## Jon Kleinberg - Wikipedia

Townsend, Resource allocation under asymmetric information, Econometrica Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica Wilson, Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes, in: T. Be-wley Ed. Bulow, P. Hartline, T. Dhangwatnotai, T.

### A Research Blog

Roughgarden, Q. Beccaria, Tentativo analitico su i contrabbandi, in: G. Francioni, S. Romagnoli Eds. Gale, L. Shapley, College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69 Shapley, H. Scarf, On cores and indivisibility, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 Shapley, M. Daskalakis, P. Goldberg, C. Chen, X. Deng, Settling the complexity of two-player nash equilibrium. Neyman, Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, Economics Letters 19 Rubinstein, Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 39 Roughgarden, E.

Tardos, How bad is selfish routing? Brown, Iterative solution of games by fictitious play, in: T. Koopmans Ed. Hart, A.

follow site Mas-Colell, Y. Roughgarden, Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy, in: Proceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz, Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords, American Economic Review 97 Varian, Position auctions, international Journal of industrial Organization 26 Mehta, A.

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Saberi, U. Vazirani, V. Pennock, R. Sami, Computational aspects of prediction markets, in: N. Nisan, T. Tardos, V. Vazirani Eds. Ali, Probability and utility estimates for racetrack bettors, Journal of Political Economy 85 pp. Thaler, W. Forsythe, F. Nelson, G. Neumann, J. Wright, Anatomy of an experimental political stock market, The American Economic Review Jackson, A.

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Wolinsky, A strategic model of social and economic networks, Journal of Economic Theory 71 Fabrikant, A. Luthra, E. Maneva, C.